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Focusing on the aspect of violence, this paper investigates the extent to which the factor oil influences the occurrence of violence as well as what other causal factors are also contributing to its occurrence. Moreover, the relative significance of the particular factors triggering violence and their specific interplay is analyzed. This approach does not imply a general denial of the oil-violence link in Nigeria, but it does demonstrate the necessity of undertaking a comprehensive analysis of this assumed link in a way that systematically takes into account domestic and international contextual factors, which are indispensable in explaining the historical dynamics of violence in Nigeria.
The study puts particular emphasis on the increase in violence within the Niger Delta since the second half of the 1990s. The central question is as follows: What are the reasons for this increase in violent conflict? This leads to the additional question of why this increase in violence did not occur until the second half of the 1990s, even though the severely negative impacts of oil exploitation existed long before that point-a question that has been rather neglected in the debate on the resource curse in Nigeria to date. This paper proceeds as follows: Before entering into the in-depth case study, a critical overview of the academic debate on natural resources and their impact on violence is given; it presents the latest findings as well as existing explanatory deficiencies. Subsequently, the comprehensive "context approach"-the analytical framework for this exploratory study-is introduced (Section 2). Hereafter follow the classification and operationalization of the level and dimensions of violence in Nigeria (Section 3.1)-as already indicated, with a particular emphasis on the increase in violence in the Niger Delta since the second half of the 1990s.
This means that other incidences of violence are not included in the study, even if they are also (more or less directly) linked to the factor oil. 1 Following a structural analysis of the relevant resource-specific and non-resource-specific contextual conditions and causal mechanisms explaining the onset and dynamics of internal violence (Section 3.2), the results of the case study are summarized (Section 4). This concluding section also includes a critique of the findings of the academic debate on the general linkage between natural resources and 1 The secessionist Biafra war between 1967 and 1970 was strongly motivated by the fight over the distribution of oil rents, in addition to the struggle for political power and ethnic dominance. However, as there have already been numerous in-depth analyses of this topic, this paper shall refer simply to these studies: HarneitSievers 1992; Brunner 2002; Zinn 2005 . Another important dimension of violence, the widespread violent repression under autocratic rule in Nigeria, cannot be covered exhaustively in this paper either, and-taking into consideration its multicausal conditionality-will only be observed when there is a concrete connection to the central focus of this paper, the recent trends of violence in the Niger Delta. Finally the sporadic violent conflicts in the middle belt and the north of the country will not be examined either. Obviously, these conflicts are not completely independent from the factor oil. However, oil plays a rather subordinated role in comparison to other causal factors such as religious-ethnic polarization (Christians versus Muslims), land struggle, and (local) political power. Analyzing these dimensions of violence and their direct and indirect connection to the factor oil would exceed the scope of this paper. 7 violence. The principal aim thereby is to contribute to the further differentiation of the theoretical debate on the resource curse.
Theoretical Framework
In recent years there has been renewed and increasing interest in the study of natural resources and their diverse international and domestic impacts. Although partly divergent in their main assumptions, the two central theoretical approaches focusing on the topic of resource abundance-the rentier state theory and the resource curse thesis-both argue that resource-exporting countries are negatively affected by political, economic, and social distortions.
The Rentier State Theory and the Resource Curse Thesis
The concept of the rentier state goes back to Hossein Mahdavy's study of pre-revolutionary Iran (1971) . It was particularly expanded upon by Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (1987) , who classified a rentier state as a state in which at least 40 percent of the total government revenue consists of economic rents. These rents can be defined as "the excess over the return to capital, land, and labor when these factors of production are put to their next best use" (Dunning 2008: 39) . According to the rentier state theory, the two central effects of dependence on economic rents are economic inefficiency and, as a consequence, the obstruction of socioeconomic development (Beck 2007: 46) . With regard to the political effects, the rentier state theory proposes that (oil) rents have a stabilizing effect on authoritarian rule (Mahdavy 1971; Beblawi/Luciani 1987; Ross 2001) . Initially based on empirical findings in the Middle East, the rentier state theory is claimed by its proponents to be universally valid (Beck 2007: 44) . It attributes the linkage between oil rents and authoritarianism to the following causal mechanisms: Firstly, it is presumed that oil rents foster the formation of stabilizing patronage networks, widespread clientelism, and assistentialistic distribution policies, all of which lessen the pressure from the population to democratize and may additionally result in the depoliticization of the society. Secondly, the abundance of revenues generated by the oil sector means that national rulers do note need to tax the population. This again may disburden the political elite of demands from the population for political participation and accountability on the part of the elites. The rentier state theory does not focus primarily on violence, but rather on the stability of authoritarian rule. However, as Ross and others illustrate, it can be assumed that resource wealth makes it easier for authoritarian rulers to use violence in the form of political repression, for example, because it enables the financing of a massive security apparatus (Ross 2001; Karl 2007) .
Over the last decade, another theoretical approach-the resource curse thesis-has gained importance within the theoretical debate on natural resources. Some authors place special em-phasis on the economic characteristics of resource-rich countries. Building upon the basic assumptions of rentier state theory, they claim that resource wealth is linked to poor economic growth (Auty 1993; Sachs/Warner 2001) and other economic problems such as Dutch disease effects and poor performance of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors accompanied by an insufficient degree of diversification and extreme vulnerability towards external shocks. A further branch of the resource curse thesis focuses on the link between natural resources and violent conflicts (Collier/Hoeffler 2001; Le Billon 2001; de Soysa 2000) . The central hypothesis-partly contradictory to the rentier state theory's assumptions-is that resourcedependent countries are more likely to experience internal instability and violent conflict than non-resource countries.
The causal mechanisms assumed to be responsible for this link include, on the one hand, the fact that natural resources can be the motive for violent conflicts. This means that parts of the population might feel that they are deprived of the financial benefits of the resource revenues-while possibly also suffering from the ecological and social impacts of production (motive of grievance)-or that resource wealth can be the target of avaricious rebels who wish to take possession of the resource revenues (motive of greed) (Collier/Hoeffler 2001) . On the other hand, resource revenues can serve as a catalyst for violent conflict by financing the rebel groups and other actors involved (opportunity, feasibility) and thus prolonging the conflict (Collier/Hoeffler 2004) . Finally, resources, and especially oil, can indirectly increase the likelihood of violent conflict by weakening political institutions and/or by triggering socioeconomic decline. Authors such as Fearon and Latin argue that "oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses than one would expect given their level of income because the rulers have less need of a socially intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues" (Fearon/Laitin 2003: 81) .
Developing a Differentiated "Context Approach" through the Inclusion of Contextual

Conditions
Referring to the contradictory empirical results of econometric studies, deficient databases, and the existence of various outliers-resource countries such as Botswana, Chile, or Norway, which are stable and economically prosperous democracies-more recent literature on the resource curse has partly questioned the alleged resources-violence link (He- Some authors, such as Di John (2007) and Rosser (2006) , have underlined the potential relevance of external factors, "social forces," and historical aspects, without testing them, so far, in in-depth empirical studies. Consequently, there is still a lack of systematic comparative 9 studies analyzing the effects of a broader set of contextual factors on the predicted resourceviolence link. This paper, which is part of a larger research project with a comparative research design 2 , aims to respond to this research gap. To this end, it uses a newly elaborated comprehensive matrix of central contextual factors concerning the potential relationship between resources and violence. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned assumptions of the recent and more differentiated branches of the resource curse theory as well as the general theoretical approaches of peace and conflict research (Imbusch 2005; Senghaas 2004 ) and the debate regarding the "political economy of war" (Ruf 2003) , this matrix consists of the set of contextual factors presented in Table 1 . only the dynamics of the international oil price (boom and bust cycles) but also the potential international rivalry for control of the resources (Giordano et al. 2005; Humphreys 2005) .
A key domestic non-resource-specific contextual condition is certainly the level and the dynamics of socioeconomic development. This implies the situation before the beginning of the resource extraction, which, independently of the resources factor, determines the internal conflictivity of a country (Imbusch 2005) and may also inform the subsequent handling of the resources and the resource rents (Soares de Oliveira 2005) . In addition, the performance and quality of political institutions (efficiency and legitimacy) as well as ethnic or religious cleavages (Fearon/Laitin 2003) and the behavioral patterns of the elite are of basic importance to the political stability of any given country. Hence, it seems logical that this fact also applies to the question of conflictivity in resource-abundant countries as well. Moreover, the general performance of the political and economic institutions moulds the specific manner of resource management and thereby influences the level of violence and conflict (Boschini et al. 2004 In sum, the main assumptions of the context approach are that the influence of resource wealth on violence is limited and that its impact depends decisively on further resourcespecific and non-resource-specific contextual conditions. Secondly, it is hypothesized that violence is more probable the more the negative influences of the above-mentioned resourcespecific and non-resource-specific contextual conditions are at work (and vice versa). Even so, it is not expected that the contextual conditions operate according to a simple linear interplay.
The particular impact of the contextual conditions and their interplay in the case of Nigeria will be analyzed using an inductive-explorative approach and from a comparative historical perspective in the following section. The underlying country-specific hypothesis is that the increase in violence since the second half of the 1990s-although linked to the factor oilcannot be explained without considering the crucial impact of various non-resource-specific factors and the inherent dynamism of certain causal mechanisms.
3 Case Study of the Oil-state Nigeria
Dynamics of Violence in the Niger Delta
The dependent variable of the present analysis is defined as any form of physical violence.
Physical violence includes violent internal conflicts and revolts as well as violent state repression and human rights violation. As already mentioned above, the analysis focuses on violence in the main oil-producing area of Nigeria, the Niger Delta, since the second half of the 1990s. Before the dynamics of violence in the delta are described, it should be emphasized that there is a general lack of data concerning incidences of violence in Nigeria, particularly with respect to the subnational level. The precise number of fatalities is therefore highly contested (Engel 2005: 194; Bergstresser 2008 Already in the 1970s there were spontaneous protests and local conflicts in the Niger Delta.
In contrast to the current situation, these "uprisings" were mostly nonviolent (Danler/Brunner 1996: 34) Moreover, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his combatants were sentenced to death. Building upon the overview of the level of violence in the Niger Delta provided in this section, the following section will analyze how the illustrated increase in violence, as well as its changing dimensions, can be explained. It will focus especially on identifying those mechanisms via which the factor oil has a decisive influence on the dynamics of violence, but also other relevant contextual conditions and causal mechanisms which have to be taken into consideration. It should be added that the dynamics of violence have recently been at least temporarily interrupted due to the declaration of a 60-day amnesty offer, which the Nigerian government proposed at the beginning of August 2009 for all militants who hand over their arms. As part of the amnesty program, those ex-militants renouncing violence are to receive financial compensation and shall participate in special rehabilitation schemes as well. While some militant groups initially resisted involvement, ultimately more than 8,000 militants are said to have joined the amnesty program and thousands of guns have been collected so far (Vanguard 2009 ).
Thus, the amnesty scheme can be considered a first successful step towards ending violence-though it is only a short-term measure and the momentary peace in the Niger Delta is very fragile. The failure of similar amnesty programs in the past makes some observers rather skeptical about the long-term success of these measures (BBC 2009; Duffield 2009).
Contextual Factors and Mechanisms Explaining the Dynamics of Violence
Resource-specific Contextual Conditions
Oil Dependence and Abundance
Commercial oil production in Nigeria began in 1956 and has been of predominant importance for the national economy since the 1970s. During that decade the absolute oil production as well as the dependence of the country on the oil exports increased significantly. Nigeria's dependence on oil, measured by oil exports as a percentage of total national exports or by oil rents as a percentage of overall government revenue, has been extremely high since the middle of the seventies and even higher than, for example, that of petrostate Venezuela. 10 The consequence has been an intensified vulnerability to the volatility of the global oil price.
Simultaneous to the increase in oil production, the export of agricultural products began to decline. While agricultural products constituted approximately 80 percent of total national exports in 1960, already in 1976 they accounted for only 4 percent (Mogues/Morris et al. 2008: 9) . This development was accompanied by a surge in food imports.
Nigeria's oil abundance in terms of national revenues deriving from oil exports is highly volatile and depends on the global oil price. Measured in absolute numbers it is, nevertheless, quite substantial; in recent years in particular, oil exports have generated significant revenue for the Nigerian government. Today Nigeria is the eleventh-largest oil producer in the world and, due to its low internal consumption, the eighth-largest oil exporter (bfai 2008). 1 9 7 5 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 7
Source: OPEC data at http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/interactive/FileZ/sumt bl.htm (accessed 13.09.2009).
Considering the rapidly growing population of Nigeria, which in 2005 exceeded 140 million, the fuel revenues per capita are remarkably low. Seen from a historical perspective, they decreased even more during the 1980s; however, even in 2007, when the oil price was very high, they accounted for only US$391 per capita, whereas in Saudi Arabia, for example, oil revenues per capita accounted for US$8569. This low per capita oil wealth can be considered to be one of the factors explaining why oil in Nigeria cannot have a stabilizing or conflict-reducing effect comparable to that in oilexporting countries such as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. Moreover, the substantial decline in oil revenues in the 1980s and 1990s can also be viewed as having contributed to an increase in the potential for conflict (Danler/Brunner 1996: 34) . However, it was not only the shrinking abundance of oil but also its interplay with the weak resource management performance in the country that caused further socioeconomic problems.
Resource Management and Economic Distortions
Resource management in Nigeria generally has to be considered as being of limited effectiveness and lacking sustainability (Sala-i-Martin 2003) . This triggers conflicts in several ways:
Firstly, due to the lack of sustainable management on the part of the multinational oil companies on the one hand and the Nigerian state on the other, oil production is causing severe environmental damage in the Niger Delta. Oil spills have led to the contamination of water resources, the destruction of farmland, and the dispersion of As a result, the Delta states were deprived off substantial income and the-already existent-resentment of the southern regions towards the central government was fueled (see also "Political system" and "Relations between Identity Groups"). Under the constitution of 1999 the share of the oil revenues refunded to the oil-producing Niger Delta states was raised to 13 percent. Although Nigeria's oil rent per capita is relatively low in comparison to other oil states, this increased share is not at all marginal, especially in view of the much higher oil price in recent years. In practice, however, these revenues have not reached the majority of the people because large amounts have "disappeared" within the states' and local governments' budgets, which are totally lacking in transparency (Human Rights Watch 2007: 32-11 The oil spills are the result not only of obsolete and rotten pipelines but also partly of acts of sabotages on the pipelines by various actors, who want to offset oil illegally, to receive compensation money from the oil companies, or to undertake sabotage as an act of protest (Zinn 2005: 106; ICG 2006a: i In the 1970s the increasing oil revenues were at least partly used for industrialization projects and the expansion of the health und education systems (Bergstresser 1993: 355) . However, as the industrialization projects were rather capital intensive and poorly designed, they hardly had any sustainable development effects and did not lead to the successful diversification of the national economy (Bergstresser 1993: 351) . Large amounts of oil revenues were squandered for unproductive projects, or projects were simply designed to dispense large amounts of money to certain privileged groups. The increasingly inefficient squandering of govern- To the extent that specific data for the Niger Delta is available, the tendency of sharply growing poverty can also be confirmed for this region (UNDP 2006: 35) A final factor that should be mentioned in the context of insufficient resource management, but which is also a general problem resulting from economic distortions in oil economies, is widespread unemployment. The oil industry is generally very capital intensive but not labor intensive. In Nigeria this structural problem is particularly pronounced, as oil is hardly processed within the country but rather immediately exported. 16 The entire oil industry in the country is said to employ only about 35,000 people, directly and indirectly (AI 2005: 35) . In the Niger Delta the oil industry has destroyed jobs in the agricultural sector, and there have been no countermeasures from the government (Kappel 1991 
Geographic Location of Resources within the Country
The geographical definition of the Niger Delta region used in this paper includes the nine states Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers, where most of the national oil production is concentrated. The Niger Delta is located in the southeastern part of Nigeria and is largely covered with marshes, forests and creeks. It isespecially for nonlocals-a difficult-to-access territory and was hence an excellent area for militant groups to retreat to once the violent conflict had started (Ukeje 2008: 10) . While probably not of superior importance, this aspect can nevertheless be considered one of the reasons for the prolongation of existing conflicts between militant groups and governmental actors. Further, the geographical characteristics of the Niger Delta make the area extremely vulnerable to oil spills and other collateral damage resulting from oil exploitation (as elaborated in the "Resource management" section). For example, spilled oil is often caught up in the stagnant water of the marshland and contaminates the drinking water.
Deep offshore oil production in the Gulf of Guinea has only recently become more relevant.
Today this offshore production represents about 15 percent of Nigeria's total oil production.
Offshore exploitation is far more expensive; nevertheless, it has become more attractive to multinational oil companies in the context of the increased attacks on oil facilities in the Niger Delta. Although the attacks on offshore oil platforms by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in June 2008 showed that offshore oil production is not beyond the reach of militant aggression, offshore operations are still markedly less vulnerable than operations in the Delta. A further shift of oil production into the Gulf of Guinea could moreover at least somewhat reduce the grievance-related conflict potential, as the people in the Delta would be less affected by air, land, and drinking water pollution.
Domestic and International Actors Involved in the Resource Sector
Since the foundation of the national oil company Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1977, the Nigerian oil sector has been characterized by joint-venture contracts between NNPC and private, mostly multinational oil companies. On average, NNPC owns 57 percent of the joint ventures. NNPC has traditionally been considered to be inefficient, and especially since the economic crisis at the end of the 1980s and the 1990s, it has suffered from a lack of financial funding from the government (EIU 2009: 22 Because of their economic importance (for example, technical know-how), the multinationals and especially Shell have influenced the dynamics of the violent conflicts, mainly through three causal channels: Firstly, they obviously carry at least part of the blame for the environmental pollution caused by oil production in the Delta. 17 Furthermore, they have indirectly contributed to the increased militarization of the conflicts, for example, by demanding that the Nigerian state provide official security services (Omotola 2006: 16) , even when the civil protests were still mainly peaceful, as in the mid-1990s (Engel 2005: 196) . The oil companies also make use of private security services, some of which are extremely brutal. Some oil companies have also provided financial assistance to potential militant actors in order to "pacify" them (ICG 2006: 24-25) . While this might reduce violence in the short term, the risks of further empowerment of militant groups in the long run are obvious (Hazen/Horner 2007: 38).
Finally, foreign oil companies provide financial support and different types of "development projects" to their so-called host communities. This engagement was increased after the Ogoni protests, and while it-in the absence of responsible state actors-brings about some shortterm mitigation of daily burdens for the local people, it also has conflict-triggering impacts.
The donations for example generate resentment between the people of the host communities and other (ethnic) communities which do not benefit from such financial support (Human Rights Watch 1999a: 102).
The Transnational Oil-theft Network
Another resource-specific contextual condition resulting from various national and international actors and clearly contributing to the increase in and especially the continuation of violent conflict in the Niger Delta in recent years is the illegal oil trade, which has increased drastically since 2000 (HRW 2005: 9) . The International Crisis Group reports that various industry experts have estimated "that Nigeria loses anywhere from 70,000 to 300,000 barrels per day to illegal bunkering" (ICG 2006: 8) . This means between 3 and 12 percent of the country's total oil production. 18 The illegally bunkered oil is shipped to refineries in Ivory 17 Nevertheless, the Nigerian state is also to blame for not ensuring compliance to indispensable standards to protect nature and human beings. Furthermore, damage is also caused by the intentional sabotage of oil facilities. The percentage of acts of sabotage in relation to the total oil spills is obviously highly contested between the oil companies and the local population and there is a significant lack of data.
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Some sources even indicate higher numbers of up to 15 percent of national oil production (Ikelegbe 2005: 222 local and regional politicians; and other powerful actors such as godfathers and international business people. Some analysts also claim that the involvement reaches to the "highest levels of government" (Lubeck/Watts/Lipschutz 2007: 9) . Because of the broad involvement of influential persons in illegal oil theft, the state approach to solving the Niger Delta crisis is marked by significant inconsistency and, despite growing militarization, persistent reluctance and a lack of engagement.
International Demand and Customer Structure
Nigeria currently exports the majority of its oil, approximately 50 percent, to the United States (EIU 2009). 22 The United States, in turn, imports approximately 10 percent of its oil from Nigeria, and intends to increase this share (Lubeck/Watts 2007: 4) . The relationship between the two countries since Nigeria's transition to democracy in 1999 has been harmonious and has been marked by a very benevolent attitude towards Nigeria on the part of the United States (Bergstresser/Tull 2008: 19) . In parallel with the expansion of oil imports from Nigeria, the United States has increased its supplying of weapons to the country and has expanded its military presence in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, via naval patrols (Tull 2007: 123; Hazen/Horner 2007: 101) . Moreover, in December 2005 the two countries announced coordinated actions to counter small arms trafficking, to bolster maritime and coastal security, to promote community development and combat poverty, and to fight money laundering and other financial crimes (Lubeck/Watts/Lipschutz 2007: 19) .
Primarily because of its own economic interests (oil supply), and also because of strategic considerations with respect to the role of Nigeria as a regional power in West Africa, the United States is generally interested in reducing the internal instability in the country. Nevertheless, the United States' efforts to exert its influence on the violent conflict in the Niger
Delta have, at least to date, been of low intensity (Lubeck/Watts 2007: 20) .
As already indicated, oil has not been the only causal factor influencing the increase and changes in violence in the Niger Delta. Moreover, it is at times part of a complex interaction 
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Actively involved or taking bribes for not hindering the smaller vessels with stolen oil which provide larger tankers waiting offshore.
22 While China has in recent years become a major consumer of oil or other natural resources for other resourceexporting countries in Africa, Nigeria exports only minor quantities of oil to China. with multiple non-resource-specific contextual conditions. These contextual conditions will therefore be analyzed more closely in the following section.
Non-resource-specific Contextual Conditions
Relations between Identity Groups
Nigeria is an extremely heterogeneous country, marked by diverse and sometimes overlapping ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages. The country is home to approximately 250 different ethnic groups (Brunner 2002: 123) . The mainly Muslim Hausa-Fulani, primarily con- Two key cleavages between ethnic and religious identity groups are most notably triggering violence in the Delta. The first is a cleavage at the national level between north and south:
The existing ethnic and religious differences between the economically less developed north, dominated by the Muslim Hausa-Fulani people, and the mainly Christian, ethnically heterogeneous south were exacerbated and politicized by the different forms of colonial rule (for details see Brunner 2002: 132ff.) . Thus, even before oil production began to dominate the country, this split had created a sharp internal division in the country. The majority of the southern population, especially the minorities, general mistrusted the political domination of the northern elites and their overwhelming influence on the central government. This mistrust and the lack of nationhood has endangered the internal stability of the country independently from the factor oil up to today.
The second cleavage, localized within the Niger Delta, is provoking violence in the region even more directly: interethnic and intercommunity conflicts. A central dimension of these conflicts has been minority ethnic groups' concern about the dominance of the major groups.
An example would be the Ogoni people's fear of Igbo dominance, an anxiety which goes back to colonial times (Brunner 2002: 252) . The other central dimension of these conflicts is the struggle between the major ethnic group, the Ijaw, and other ethnic groups, especially the Itsekiri, Urhobo and Andoni, mostly regarding the ownership of land and local power 
Demographic Factors and Social Structures
While the population density in Nigeria is generally quite high, the population density in the habitable parts of the Niger Delta is even above the national average (UNDP 2006: 24) , and it is persistently increasing. This high population density is causing land scarcity and can therefore be considered another factor fueling the internal conflictivity-in interplay with the above-presented fact that the region is very fragmented ethnically. 24 A further aspect that may have contributed to the increase in violence in the Niger Delta is the loss of influence of family clans and traditional societal structures. Within recent decades the social and political authority of local traditional rulers (such as chiefs and kings) has significantly declined, partly because of changing patterns of society worldwide in the course of modernization and globalization and partly also because of the fact that these traditional rulers had collaborated with oil companies and the political elite for their own personal benefit (UNDP 2006: 42) . The consequence has been a change in the principal actors of resistance and struggle in the Niger Delta, who are now younger, mostly male actors (Obi 2006: 41-42) . They are generally more prone to violence, especially given the high level of unemployment in the Delta and the fact that without the social support of traditional family structures the young people are hit even harder by this endemic unemployment.
Efficiency and Legitimacy of Political Institutions
Nigeria is not only ethnically and religiously fragmented but is also marked by the fragmentation of its political structure, something which results in the persistent weakness of the political institutions and a lack of central coordination (Lewis 2007: 282) . Reinforced by the regional tripartition of colonial rule (Brunner 2002: 132ff.) and the existing cultural fragmentation, the weakness of the political system was not at all remedied when Nigeria became independent in 1960. The historically weak political institutions, which undermined the effectiveness of the political output and reduced the state's capacity to provide internal stability, were never sustainably consolidated. Moreover, the rudimentary political institutions were further destroyed and delegitimized by the successive military regimes, which reinforced paternalistic patterns of political rule. The military dictators, especially Babangida and Abacha, used the oil rents to co-opt the traditional rulers (for example, chiefs or, in the north, emirs) of the country in order to bolster their political legitimacy, thereby fostering a culture of rent seeking and endemic corruption. that there are a considerable number of well-armed, disillusioned young people, many of whom were "dismissed" after the elections as the politicians no longer had any use for them.
For example, the powerful militant leaders Ateke Tom (head of the Niger Delta Vigilante) and Alhaji Asari Dokubo (head of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force) were "actively deployed (and paid) by high ranking politicians to be political thugs during elections" (Lubeck/Watts/Lippschutz 2007: 8) .
In sum, the failure of the democratic political institutions can be considered one of the basic contextual conditions providing the opportunity for the increase in and especially the enduring continuity of violence in the Niger Delta.
Substate Actors
Due at least partly to the weakness of the official political institutions, informal arrangements and particular substate actors have always been of high importance in Nigerian politics. Hazem and Horner refer in their statements to this World Bank report. cial attention in the context of the increase in violence since 1999 should therefore be paid to the so-called "godfathers." Godfathers are not democratically legitimate, but in practice they exercise crucial political influence in Nigeria because they are wealthy and socially powerful individuals. They support political candidates, frequently making use of violence, 27 and in return demand to have control over political decisions and to receive personal benefits or political protection for their illegal activities, amongst other things oil theft (Walker 2008) . Godfatherism can be considered to be "both a symptom and a cause of the violence and corruption that together permeate the political process in Nigeria" and particularly in the Niger Delta (HRW 2007: 34) . Within this vicious circle, godfatherism further reduces the legitimacy of government and perpetuates the political culture of irresponsible leadership.
Another symptom of the failure of the democratic political institutions is the absence of a viable system of political parties. The unambiguously dominant political party is the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), 28 which hardly has a clear ideological concept (Nwankwo 2003: 138) but rather serves to facilitate corruption and patronage networks. As the PDP controls the machinery of the state, it has access to large state funds, which are used to "buy" political loyalty and to mobilize violence to enforce loyalty (HRW 2007: 36) . This is not only further undermining the democratic legitimacy of the political actors but also directly contributing to the increase in violence in the Delta. According to a Human Rights Watch report, armed groups in Rivers state, for example, "openly acknowledge that they were sponsored by the PDP to rig the 2003 elections" (HRW 2007: 23) .
Behavioral Patterns of Elites and Political Culture
The decades of (repressive) military rule have obviously influenced the political culture of the country. Consequently, Nigeria is marked not only by weak political institutions but also, in interaction with the latter, by a lack of democratic leadership, especially at the level of the state governors and the local political elites (Ologbenla 2007) . This is evident, firstly, in the widespread tendency of elites to use the public offices and political power to pursue private interests (IDEA 2001: 243) . With the transition to democracy this cupidity has become more publicly evident, and it is therefore increasingly causing anger within the population. Although this aspect does not appear to be of primary relevance, it can be regarded as one of the factors indirectly accounting for the increased potential for conflict in recent years.
Secondly, this political culture is evident in the Niger Delta policy, which can to a large extent be classified as a "carrot-stick strategy" (Hazen/Horner 2007: 96) . A few, insufficient, incentives for the reduction of militancy on the part of the armed groups are accompanied by "heavy-handed military tactics" (Hazen/Horner 2007: 96 ture can also be identified within the security forces and within the police, both of which were for decades educated in authoritarian practices and therefore remain highly militarized (Hazen/Horner 2007: 102) . It is also evident within the Joint Task Force (composed of the army and police forces), which has been posted in the Niger Delta since 2003 and is notorious for its human rights violations and its immoderate use of force, for instance, extrajudicial killings and looting (see Human Rights Watch reports 1999; 2002; . 29 Among the militant groups as well as the population of the Niger Delta in the course of recent years, a generally growing frustration with the absence of any improvement can be asserted. Especially for the younger generations, the "lesson" of the Ogoni protests in the middle of the 1990s is that peaceful protest does not produce any positive results. As the transition to democracy, which was associated with a lot of expectations and hope for improvement of the socioeconomic situation, has been largely disappointing, the people's willingness to use violence has been further strengthened.
(Informal) International Interdependence and Spillover Effects: Weapon Trade
The increased supply of potentially militant actors with weapons, who have already been mentioned, is one of the crucial aspects explaining the increased opportunities for violent struggle since the end of the 1990s. The circulation of weapons is not just caused by the corrupt and greedy intentions of national politicians and security forces; it also has international dimensions. Estimates regarding the proliferation of weapons in Nigeria assume the presence of one to three million small arms-the majority of them unlicensed and therefore illegal (Hazen/Horner 2007: 25) . Community armories now appear to be a "common phenomenon" in the Delta (Hazen/Horner 2007: 91) .
In part, the presence of these weapons can be traced back to the Biafra War; others have been In summarizing the analysis of the particular contextual conditions, it can be concluded that several central contextual conditions and associated mechanisms have been detected that can be considered root causes of conflict and other forms of violence, independently of the effect of
oil. Yet the "pre-oil era" of Nigeria and the Niger Delta were marked by a high potential for conflict: Firstly, because of ethnic cleavages, which manifested as a national polarization between south and north and as various other cleavages within the Niger Delta. Secondly, because of the general weakness and instability of political institutions, something which also has to be taken into consideration. Nigeria did not gain independence until 1960 and its political structures had been fragmented by the influence of colonial rule. Hence, when massive oil exploitation began, the country did not have consolidated political institutions, nor was it in an advanced process of nation building. Finally, even before oil production started, the Niger Delta had been marked by poverty and a lack of modernization.
While these non-resource-specific factors had already reacted with each other before the beginning of the oil production and had thus reinforced the probability of violent conflict, they have since interacted with the factor oil in such a way that oil has explicitly served as an additional conflict-triggering factor. This is especially true of the link between oil and the existing ethnic cleavages: On the one hand, because of the high concentration of oil reserves in the southeast, the issue of the distribution of oil rents has further exacerbated the existing mistrust between the northern Hausa-Fulani elites and the southern ethnic minorities. In this sense oil has fostered the Niger Delta states' struggles, and those of particular ethnic groups within the Delta, for more autonomy. The call for increased autonomy is still a central feature of the discourses of militant groups such as the NDPVF and MEND. 30 Furthermore, and even more relevant in the context of this paper, the factor oil has-in tandem with demographic aspects (growing population density) and the resource-management approach-intensified the violent intercommunal clashes in the Delta. As land tenure arrangements in the oil-exploiting regions result in oil revenues and other selective (financial) benefits being distributed by the oil companies to their host communities, boundary conflicts between different ethnic communities, which compete for financial support, have been exacerbated.
The combination of the rising importance of the oil production with the weak political institutions and the-still unfinished-state-building process (Brunner 2002: 292ff.) in Nigeria has moreover fueled corruption and widespread patronage networks. This has fostered mismanagement and the formation of informal political arrangements based on the private 30 In contrast, those with more radical secessionist aspirations, which provoked, for example, the Biafra war, have today become almost silent. personal profits of the actors involved, who often approve or even actively foment violence, most notably in the case of the so-called godfathers.
Finally, the oil industry has also caused the deepening of socioeconomic distortions in the national economy, mainly due to Nigeria's extremely high dependence on the resource sector and the decline of the agricultural sector, which has paralleled the growth of the oil industry.
While the oil industry is generally very capital intensive, it is not labor intensive (Karl 2007: 6) . In Nigeria this limited employment capacity, a structural problem in all petrostates, is particularly pronounced because of the low capacity of the national oil company and the insuffi- Second, and of even greater importance, was the transition to democracy in 1999. The main direct consequence, which has influenced the dynamics of violence, has been the easing of the political repression of oppositional groups and protests (an impact which is not related to the factor oil). The main indirect consequence has been the widespread recruitment by corrupt politicians of mostly unemployed young men, who were given an abundant supply of arms and who have today become the main violent actors in the Delta. Initially there was only an indirect and diffuse link to the factor oil, as the young men were first of all engaged by the politicians in order to fight their political opponents, intimidate potential voters in the context of elections, or just to protect them. As most of the weapons distributed in the process have not been returned and many of the young men were dropped after the elections because the politicians no longer had any use for them, these young men's agitation has nevertheless developed its own dynamics of violence; thus, today the agitation is closely linked to oil, mainly through complex oil-theft and arms-trade networks, which in addition to parts of the militant groups also involve Nigerian politicians, security forces, and other substate and international actors. This broad involvement of different actors in illegal actions is impeding comprehensive government initiatives to dry up the militant actors' sources of income and thus-in interaction with the persistent, severe grievances-helps to explain the perpetuation of the violent conflicts.
Conclusions
The paper has studied the specific influence of oil abundance and other resource-specific and non-resource-specific contextual factors on violence in the Niger Delta, which has been on the rise since the second half of the 1990s. The findings confirm the underlying hypothesis that oil has indeed had a substantial influence on the occurrence and dynamics of the violent conflict, but that it is by no means sufficient to exhaustively explain the violence. This seems to highlight the necessity of revising the assumptions of the existing approaches of the resource curse thesis. Further contextual factors, which have to date been neglected by the established theoretical approaches, have been proven to be of crucial importance. These include contextual conditions which, initially independently of the factor oil, have constituted central root causes of violent conflicts and stem from the "pre-oil era": the low level of socioeconomic development, interwoven cultural and political cleavages, weak political institutions, and unconsolidated statehood.
On the other hand, oil and oil rents have explicitly served as an additional conflict-triggering factor, but only in a complex interplay with a broader set of resource-specific as well as nonresource-specific contextual factors. Oil has been a motive for (initially mostly nonviolent)
grievance-related conflicts, as the resident population in the Delta has felt that it is deprived of the financial benefits of the resource revenues while it also suffers the disastrous ecological and social impacts of oil production. These grievances were further aggravated in the context of the deep economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, which was linked to the factor oil through the causal chain of mismanagement, indebtedness, and falling global oil prices. In this respect, the assumptions of the rentier state theory concerning the typical socioeconomic distortions in petrostates due to the self-privileging of the elites instead of productive reinvestment (Beck 2007: 46) apply strongly to the case of Nigeria.
However, oil has also increased the opportunity for violent conflicts, principally by financing the militant groups involved. The establishment of this mechanism was only possible because of oil's impact on the already weak political institutions: oil rents promoted endemic corruption and patronage networks, both of which provide the structural basis for the broad involvement of various actors in illegal oil bunkering. The widespread oil theft and trade in weapons are additionally triggered by the contributions of international actors, who are earning significant profits and are therefore not interested in ending the violence. Consequently, while grievances as a motive for conflict remain widely unchanged for the majority of Niger Delta residents (and entail active or at least passive support of the militant groups by parts of the population), this motive has recently been increasingly overtaken by the partly autonomous dynamics of an economy of violence which is fueled by, first, the illegal oil trade and, second, by kidnapping.
The results presented here contribute to the further differentiation of the current academic debate on oil and violence. The findings shall, in a further step, be integrated with the insights of other case studies analyzed in the above-mentioned research project. Through com-parative analysis, systematizations and-as far as possible-generalizations of the findings will be produced. The following questions are of particular interest: Do other cases confirm the high importance of the "pre-oil" context? Can the ambivalent impact of oil-fueled corruption and patronage networks, which are triggering low-intensity conflicts but which are also contributing to the prevention of conflict escalation, be confirmed by the cases in other countries? And furthermore, can the importance of unemployment-especially in combination with the disintegration of societal and family structures-be confirmed by other cases?
